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This paper starts by discussing consumers' cognitive and emotional reaction to posted prices. Cognitively,
some consumers do not appear to make effective use of price information to maximize their consumption-based
utility. Emotionally, prices can induce regret and anger among consumers. The optimal responses
of firm's prices to these reactions can explain why firms charge prices below marginal cost for many
goods and why they keep their prices rigid. This explanation of price rigidity has the advantage of
being consistent with the observation that the typical size of price increases is nearly invariant to inflation.
Lastly, the paper turns to some government policies regarding prices that appear to have some consumer
support. It argues that both laws against price gouging and laws regulating the terms of mortgages
may have support because consumers recognize that many people do not optimize their consumption
effectively and because they are angry at firms that take advantage of this. These attitudes can also
explain consumer support for monetary policies that maintain a low level of average inflation.
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jrotemberg@hbs.eduIn the textbook conception of economics, consumers use prices to determine the bundle
of purchases that maximize their utility subject to the constraint that the total value of
these purchases cannot exceed their income. In this paper, I consider the implications of
letting consumers have somewhat di®erent reactions to prices. First, I allow consumers to
be unsophisticated when they use price information to plan their expenditures. This is
a departure from the cognitive assumptions in standard economic analysis. Second, I let
consumers have emotional reactions to prices, including reactions that are motivated by the
welfare of others (as opposed to being purely sel¯sh). The paper also discusses how these
consumer reactions a®ect how ¯rms set prices, as well as their implications for government
intervention in markets.
Before turning to the psychological facets involved in understanding, setting and regu-
lating prices, it is worth recalling that the standard view that consumers view prices only as
incentives to guide their purchases has very little evidence on its side. Consistent with this
theory, consumers prefer low to high prices so that people do have a preference for being
able to make more purchases. But this demonstrates only that one of people's desires is to
be able to acquire goods and says little about whether they do this well or whether they also
have other objectives.
The additional conditions that rational utility maximization imposes on consumer be-
havior are di±cult to test, in part because consumers do not spend all their income at once.
A vast empirical literature has thus devoted itself to the analysis of whether people respond
to incentives by entering less frequently into transactions whose terms are more unfavorable.
Unfortunately this \law of demand" is a very weak test of rational utility maximization, not
only because consumer rationality does not strictly imply such a law, but also because fairly
irrational consumers could still satisfy it.
There is, on the other hand, a great deal of laboratory evidence suggesting that people
are not fully rational. There does not, however, exist consensus among economists about
the relevance of these observations for market settings. A common reaction of economists to
evidence that consumers are sometimes not fully \rational," particularly when this occurs in
1the laboratory, is to suggest that non-rational consumer behavior may not matter very much.
I am thus particularly keen on studying aspects of consumer behavior that seem to matter
for the prices that ¯rms charge or should charge. This leads me to focus on several aspects of
price setting that do not seem easy to rationalize in the standard utility-maximizing setting.
In the process, I try to provide links of these pricing patterns to psychological studies of
consumers. It is important to stress that I do not think we already have proof that non-
rational behavior causes the unusual pricing patterns I discuss. Systematic thinking about
the connection between consumer non-rationality and ¯rm pricing is still at a fairly early
stage. Nonetheless, the two do seem to be intimately related.
The paper also spends time discussing the policy implications of the consumer non-
rationalities that are suggested by the behavior of consumers and ¯rms. This is somewhat
perilous because we lack a rigorous way of discussing social welfare in the presence of the
consumer non-rationalities I emphasize. A reason to analyze policy implications in spite of
this is that one of the ways in which consumers react to prices is by mobilizing politically
and demanding changes in legislation. These political reactions seem to be part and parcel
of how consumers behave with respect to prices. One important bene¯t of bringing realistic
psychological considerations to bear on resource allocation issues is that these considerations
may explain people's behavior in the political as well as in the market arena. It is thus
worth asking how the legislative initiatives we observe ¯t with the psychological reactions of
consumers that I emphasize.
The paper is organized as follows. In the ¯rst section, I provide evidence garnered
exclusively from consumers about how they react to prices. This evidence suggests two
things. First, many people seem to ¯nd price information di±cult to process. Second,
people's emotions and moral judgments respond to the prices that they see. I emphasize that
consumers feel regret when they conclude that they made mistakes in their past purchases,
and that they experience anger at prices they regard as unfair.
The second section focuses on three particular aspects of ¯rm's pricing decisions. The
¯rst is the tendency of many ¯rms to charge prices with a lump sum component and a
2\per unit" component well below the marginal cost of providing an additional unit. In the
example of Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006), the most popular health club plans involve
paying a monthly fee which allows buyers an unlimited number of visits so the \per visit"
fee is zero. What is puzzling about this is that health clubs' marginal cost is not zero; more
frequent visits do raise costs (at least for towels).
The second is that prices often end in \attractive" numbers, of which the most popular
by far is the number 9. The third is the fact that prices for ¯nished goods do not change
as often as do prices of commodities in future markets. Indeed, price changes of ¯nished
goods do not just depart from the canonical model where every change in marginal cost
leads to a change in price, but also depart from the predictions of models where there is an
administrative cost of changing prices. While the modeling of this issue is still in its infancy,
some of the qualitative features of price changes appear consistent with the idea that ¯rms
are setting prices to deal with non standard aspects of consumer behavior. Moreover, this
approach has the advantage of being consistent with the fact that ¯rms routinely cite their
desire to please customers as their main reason to keep prices relatively rigid.
In the third section, I turn my attention to policy. I discuss two government policies
that interfere with the freedom to set contractual terms. The ¯rst is legislation to limit
\price gouging," while the second is legislation to regulate mortgages for low-income people.
In both these cases, standard economic arguments would seem to point towards allowing
people to write contracts as they see ¯t. It is thus worth understanding why people seem to
wish to limit freedom of contracting in these markets. One reason that ¯ts with the earlier
analysis is that people are angered by the terms generated by the free operation of the price
system. I then argue that, if such feelings about prices are recognized as a legitimate source
of utility, laws that interfere with the freedom to set prices can result in Pareto optimal
allocations.
I close the paper by showing that the feelings about prices explored in this paper provide
a rationale for keeping steady state in°ation low. While more conventional analyses also
reach this conclusion, I argue that the extent to which even moderate in°ation is unpopular
3suggests that the conventional analysis of this issue is incomplete.
1 Consumer processing of price information
One important question regarding consumers is whether they reach the maximum of their
own utility given the opportunities that they face. A large strand of literature in economics
has focused on decision making by consumers who are imperfectly informed about the alter-
natives that are potentially available to them. This lack of information leads to outcomes
that resemble in certain ways the outcomes obtained when consumers lack the ability to fully
exploit their opportunities. In both cases, an all knowing advisor could help people reach
decisions whose consequences they would prefer.
There are, however, two di®erences worth highlighting. The ¯rst is that outside observers
with only moderate knowledge can tell whether an individual used her information well, and
may feel di®erently about mistakes made due to insu±cient information and mistakes due
to naivete. The second is that, after making a decision, the decision maker herself may learn
whether she neglected some of the information she had at the time. A human activity that
has received a great deal of attention from psychologists is \counterfactual thinking," where
people revisit actions they have taken in the past and feel regret when they feel that they
should have pursued alternate courses of action. This regret would naturally be accentuated
if people determined that their past acts were not justi¯ed given the information that was
then available to them.
The second important question regarding prices is whether people only have a \cognitive"
reaction to them (where they use prices to determine their best course of action) or whether
they also have an \emotional" reaction. The connection between cognition and emotion (or
thinking and feeling) is a complicated one but there is a great deal of evidence that the two
processes are somewhat independent (see Zajonc 1984). Many researchers view emotions as
discrete (anger, happiness, fear, sadness, ...), common across cultures, and detectable in
facial expressions (see Ekman 1993).
An emotion that has attracted considerable attention from economists is happiness, which
4some view as akin to utility1 Unlike happiness, which is a \positive" emotion, regret is a
\negative" one. What makes regret particularly important for economics is that, as dis-
cussed below, there is substantial evidence that people engage in actions whose purpose is
to reduce regret. It follows that, if utility functions are to be derived from the preferences
that guide people's conscious choices, people's dislike of regret should be incorporated into
these functions.
I also consider the e®ect of prices on anger. Anger is a negative emotion as well, but it
is less clear that people engage in purposeful action to avoid it. Nonetheless, avoiding anger
seems useful for social welfare not only because it avoids the negative emotion of those in an
angry state, but also because anger seems to cause externalities. A well established property
of anger is that angry people have an impulse to hurt those they are angry with. It is thus
common for angry people to demand policies that punish those who have angered them. Any
pain in°icted by this punishment may well increase the utility of those who are angry. These
punishment policies may also serve two broader social goals. First, they provide incentives
to reduce the incidence of anger-causing actions and thereby reduce anger. Second, they
may tame the reactions of those who become angry by establishing a formal mechanism that
punishes those who cause this anger.
1.1 Price knowledge and awareness
The ¯rst question to ask about prices is whether people know how much they are paying
for things. The numerous demonstrations of the \law of demand," where total purchases for
particular goods are lower when their price is higher, suggests that at least some people do
respond to price incentives. But the validity of this law is consistent with the existence of
large subsets of the population who are only dimly aware of the prices they pay. One vehicle
for learning the extent to which people possess price information is to ask them about prices
of items that they are supposedly familiar with.
1Di Tella and McCulloch (this conference) show that self-reported \life satisfaction" is more correlated
than self-reported happiness with macroeconomic variables. Interestingly, life satisfaction does not appear
to have the same emotional intensity as happiness.
5In Dickson and Sawyer (1990), interviewers were deployed inside stores so that they could
approach shoppers immediately after they had put particular items in their shopping cart.
Shoppers were then asked to recall the price of the item they had just purchased. Even
though no more that 30 seconds had elapsed between the time of buying the item and the
time of answering this question, less than half of these subjects could recall these prices
perfectly. About a quarter of the respondents claimed not to know this price at all while the
rest gave estimates that di®ered from the true price by an average of 15%.
The Dickson and Sawyer (1990) analysis leaves open the possibility that people store price
information in a part of memory that, while useful for decision making, is not available for
immediate recall. Vanhuelen and Drµ eze (2002) thus approached people before they entered
a French hypermarket. Subjects were asked about prices of goods whose pictures they
recognized as depicting an item that they bought regularly. The fraction who could recall
the price of these items accurately was signi¯cantly smaller than in the Dickson and Sawyer
(1990) study. Vanhuelen and Drµ eze (2002) also gave their respondents a series of possible
prices (in random sequence) and asked them to say whether they saw these as good, bad or
normal deals. Using these responses, Vanhuelen and Drµ eze (2002) deem about a third of their
respondents to be \fairly knowledgeable" about prices. Still, about 14% of their respondents
were so uninformed that they viewed prices 20% above the regular price as good deals (or
prices 20% below the regular price as bad deals).
This hazy awareness of prices may also explain why some studies show a surprising
in°uence of price endings on people's purchases. The most extreme example of this is
reported in Schindler and Kevarian (1996) who, with the cooperation of a seller, sent mail-
order catalogues with di®erent endings for certain items to randomly selected customers.
They found that items with prices ending in 99 outsold those with a lower price ending in
88. Similarly Kalyanam and Shively (1998) show that Chi®on margarine sold more when it
was priced at 59 cents than when it was priced at 53 cents. It is important to stress, though,
that other studies (and other commodities within the Kalyanam and Shively (1998) study),
do not show such strong bene¯ts of ending a price with a 9.
6Consumer inattention to price is also consistent with the evidence reported in Rotem-
berg (2005), that increases in regular prices of Nabisco's saltine crackers led to negligible
reductions in the sales of that brand's crackers even when its competitor brands had not
raised their own regular prices. Such inattention is not inconsistent with the large e®ect of
temporary specials reported, for example, by Hendel and Nevo (2006). Specials are heavily
advertised and signposted, so consumers who are generally not paying much attention to
price may nonetheless increase their purchases considerably when they see a special. Such
inattention can also be consistent with the non-trivial long-run elasticities of demand re-
ported by Hendel and Nevo (2006), since this long run response may involve a gradual
absorbtion of price information by consumers.
1.2 Paying too much when confronted by a menu of price choices
Many services are sold in packages, where packages di®er in their pro¯le of required pay-
ments. Examples include credit cards, cellular phone plans, service plans for appliances,
vacation packages and health club fees. Because it is possible to compute how much con-
sumers would have paid for the services they consumed if they had picked a di®erent package
than they actually chose, it is possible to learn whether they typically choose packages that
minimize their out-of-pocket costs. This is, in a way, a very weak test of rationality because
di®erent packages also provide di®erent incentives and consumers who respond to the incen-
tives provided by the package that they buy ought to have a consumption pattern that would
be more expensive under alternative packages. This makes the ¯nding of Della Vigna and
Malmendier (2006) that people who buy monthly passes to health club pay signi¯cantly more
per visit than they would have if they had opted to pay \per visit" all the more remarkable.
Along the same lines, Lambrecht and Skiera (2006) show a similar pattern for a sample
of purchasers of internet access. In this sample, 25% of the people who pay the highest
¯xed fee for unlimited internet access would have paid less if they had chosen a \three-part-
tari®" with a lower ¯xed fee, a maximum of free usage and a marginal per-use fee for usage
exceeding this maximum. Also using a sample of actual customer records, Agarwal et al.
7(2007) report evidence of mistakes people make in their ¯nancial transactions. One particular
dramatic instance they document involves people's usage of credit cards with low \teaser"
rates on balance transfers. A catch with many of these cards is that the interest rate on new
purchases is relatively high and that interest charges on purchases accrue to anyone who
keeps a balance on the card. Given the availability of multiple cards, it is therefore optimal
not to use these cards for purchases. While many people either use this optimal strategy
from the beginning or learn it rapidly, others do not. Interestingly, these mistakes are more
likely among young and old customers, whereas middle-aged ones are more sophisticated.
Agarwal et al. (2007) consider several other instances (such as the payment of late fees on
credit cards) where people pay more for ¯nancial services than is possible using an optimal
strategy and discover a similar age pattern.
While the unsophisticated use of cards with teaser rates suggests that consumers process
price information poorly, the health club and late fee data suggest that consumers may
also su®er from overcon¯dence. They may believe that they will attend frequently when
facing low marginal prices or that they will be disciplined and pay their bills on time. In at
least some of these examples (certainly in the case of late fees), consumers eventually learn
when they make mistakes. At that point, consumers probably experience regret. Indeed,
according to Zeelenberg and Pieters's (2007): \Regret can stem from decisions to act and
from decisions not to act: The more justi¯able the decision, the less regret."
1.3 Regret
People have no di±culty recalling decisions they regret. In the domain of purchases, Patrick
et al. (2003) asked people to remember either purchases they regretted or instances where
they regretted not having made a purchase. While the intensity of the purchase regrets
exceeded that of the non-purchase regrets, both were substantial. In particular, respondents
recalled having taken actions to cope with their regret in both cases.
For non-purchases, the cause of regret is often that consumers passed up a good deal.
Indeed, in predicting their future regret, the subjects in the Simonson (1992) study, said that
8they expected to feel a lot of regret if they postponed a purchase of a wedding present until
August and ended up paying more than they would have paid in July. This e®ect is so strong
that overall purchase satisfaction often depends on whether consumers paid more than they
could have paid if they had made their purchase at a di®erent time. Cooke et al. (2001)
ask subjects for their purchase satisfaction in situations where they are sometimes forced
to buy because the experimenter tells them that they have \run out" of the product. Not
surprisingly, purchase satisfaction depends (negatively) on the price paid. In addition, this
satisfaction depends positively on the prices that the individual observed before purchasing.
Purchase satisfaction also declines if the individual is told that he could have paid a lower
price if he had delayed his purchase. These survey responses suggest that individuals compare
the outcome they obtain to outcomes they could have obtained. When they could have
obtained better outcomes, they blame themselves and su®er a loss in utility.
While psychologists ¯nd self-reported measures of satisfaction (and regret) as indicative
of people's well being, economists may be more skeptical of the relevance of these self-
reports. However, regret also matters for decision-making. People's desire to avoid blaming
themselves for bad outcomes leads them to modify their choices. The most compelling
evidence for this comes from experimental comparison of two treatments. In one treatment,
individuals do not learn what would have happened under an alternate course of action while
in the other they do. In Cooke et al. (2001), in particular, subjects face a sequence of o®ers
and must make a purchase. In one treatment, they see no o®ers after they purchase while in
the other they see the o®ers they would have received if they had not purchased. Seeking to
avoid regret at paying \too much," individuals are less prone to purchase in the treatment
where they continue to see o®ers after purchasing.
Regret looms large as a potential problem in situations where the price in question is
an interest rate and the service people have acquired is the use of someone else's money.
When the time comes to repay the loan, borrowers in di±culty will typically regret having
borrowed funds in the ¯rst place. This regret is likely to be particularly severe in cases
where people have to give up ownership of their house. Most people are extremely attached
9to their home and view its loss as a major catastrophe. This should imply that people who
anticipate that a mortgage will lead to regret if their ¯nancial condition deteriorates should
avoid borrowing against their house to ¯nance current purchases.
One problem, though, is that people may not all be equally adept at anticipating that
certain contracts have a high potential for inducing regret. People who are overcon¯dent,
in particular, may well enter into contracts that put their home ownership in jeopardy and
end up feeling a great deal of regret. At the same time, people who are capable of rationally
anticipating their own regret should also be able to anticipate the regret that is likely to be
felt by people who act in an overcon¯dent manner. Insofar as people who anticipate regret
feel empathy for people who do not, the regret-inducing acts of the latter cause utility losses
to the former. An indirect piece of evidence for this empathy us that people sometimes
appear to be upset when they learn that other individuals have engaged in transactions that
they regret. I show an example of this below.
1.4 Anger and the fairness of prices
Regret and anger are both triggered when people learn that they are worse o® than they
could have been.2 One di®erence is that, in the case of anger, someone else is blamed for
this misfortune. A related di®erence is that, as Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones (2004) put
it, anger is \linked associatively with an urge to injure some target." One way of thinking
about this emotion in traditional utility terms is to see angry people as people whose utility
increases when the target of their anger is harmed.3
While anger may not be activated in experimental settings where, and in Cooke et al.
(2001) o®ers are generated by a machine, individual sellers bear some responsibility for
what happens in real world purchase settings. People can thus blame sellers as well as
themselves when they are unhappy with their purchases. Yi and Baumgartner (2004) provide
2For a discussion of the determinants of anger, see Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones (2004) and the sympo-
sium that follows.
3For a model of this change in preferences, see Rotemberg (2007). For neurological evidence that some
pleasure centers of the brain light up when people harm those that have behaved sel¯shly in an economic
exchange, see De Quervain et al. (2004).
10some evidence for this co-mingling of emotions. Their study consists of an attempt to
distinguish among the emotions triggered by purchases. Nonetheless, they report that \A
prestudy indicated that when respondents were simply asked to recall a situation in which
they experienced, say, disappointment, they tended to report emotional episodes in which
they felt not only disappointment but also other negative emotions, such as anger and regret,
with equally high intensity." Similarly, when Patrick et al. (2003) asked people how they had
coped with the purchases (or non-purchases) that they regretted, several of their respondents
said that they expressed anger to someone about the problem.
There appears to be an association between feelings of anger and feelings that outcomes
are unfair. Mikula et al. (1998) asked a large sample of respondents to recall recent situations
where they had experienced the seven emotions joy, fear, anger, sadness, disgust, shame and
guilt. They also asked their respondents whether the event that had triggered this emotion
had been unfair. Unfairness was more strongly associated with anger than with any of the
other emotions.
In the case of pricing, evidence of anger tends to be anecdotal. In a recent dramatic
episode, the September 5, 2007 reduction in the price of the Apple IPhone by $200 led to
posting of many angry messages by people who had bought the phones before the price cut.
This anger at price declines after people have purchased (which leads people to regret their
purchase) is matched by anger at price increases in cases where people did not purchase at
the earlier lower price. Rotemberg (2004), in particular, reports several newspaper articles
where people became angry (and somewhat violent) in response to price increases that took
place after storms or after a terrorist attack. Moreover, it is well established is that such
price increases are deemed unfair by many people. Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler (1986)
asked their respondents whether it was fair for a hardware store to raise the price of its snow
shovels after a snow storm from $15 to $20. Eighty two percent of their respondents viewed
this as either \unfair" or \very unfair" and only eighteen percent saw this as either \fair" or
\acceptable." A large subsequent literature has veri¯ed this ¯nding.4
4For a paper that discusses this literature, see Xia, Monroe and Cox (2004).
11One question that remains unsettled is why such prices are seen as unfair. Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler's (1986) theory is that consumers feel that they are entitled to their
\reference transaction", while ¯rms are entitled to their \reference" level of pro¯ts. In their
formulation, these reference transactions and pro¯ts refer to past o®ers made by the ¯rm
and past pro¯ts that the ¯rm earned. Thus, after a blizzard, the consumer is entitled to
the same price as before because nothing has reduced the ¯rm's pro¯ts at this price. By
contrast, price increases that are triggered by cost increases are fair because, even though
consumers lose access to their reference transactions, ¯rms come closer to protecting their
reference level of pro¯ts.
Rotemberg (2004) discusses some limitations of this theory and provides a related and
complementary theory that seeks to derive the anger that consumers feel more directly. The
basic idea of Rotemberg (2004) is that consumers are angry at ¯rms that accentuate their
feelings of regret because ¯rms that are even minimally altruistic would refrain from doing
so. A minimally altruistic ¯rm can be expected to feel a consumer's regret vicariously and
would thus su®er a loss whenever it contributed to this regret. Firms that raise their prices
in circumstances where this has a big e®ect on regret thus demonstrate their sel¯shness. The
model of Rotemberg (2004) is based on the idea that consumers have forbearance if they
cannot reject the hypothesis that the ¯rm is minimally altruistic. If they can reject this
hypothesis, however, they become angry and seek to hurt the ¯rm.5
A ¯eld experiment whose results are consistent with these basic ideas is presented in
Anderson and Simester (2007). They compared the purchases from a mail-order catalog
of people who had received a \test" catalog with prices that were considerably lower than
earlier prices to the purchases of individuals who received a \regular" catalog without such
discounts. The post-mailing purchases of the people who received the test catalog were lower,
consistent with the idea that they turned their regret at having paid \too much" into anger
against the ¯rm.6
5As discussed in Rotemberg (2007), the ideas that people who can reject the hypothesis that others are
minimally altruistic react with anger can also explain other ¯eld and experimental ¯ndings.
6For a survey that obtains somewhat similar results, see Feinberg et al. (2002). They show that subjects
12Regret-based anger may also explain why ¯rms that increase prices in response to natural
disasters are particularly hated. Consider ¯rst the simple example of buying a snow shovel
in a blizzard. An individual doing so regrets not having bought this shovel earlier and this
regret is obviously accentuated if he learns that the price has been increased in response to
the storm. Now consider a hurricane victim. People who are hurt by hurricanes inevitably
feel regret at a variety of di®erent past actions, since negative outcomes trigger counterfactual
thinking and self-blame. When such a person encounters a large price for a hurricane-related
need, this regret is presumably accentuated since this information makes past decisions
appear worse relative to past alternatives. A somewhat altruistic seller would thus abstain
from accentuating regret, and might lower his price in such circumstances (rather than merely
keeping it constant).
In practice, price-setters do not all respond in the same way to natural disasters. As
I discuss further below, some raise their prices to such an extent that become accused of
violating legislation that forbids \price gouging." Others, by contrast, improve the terms
that they o®er purchasers. After Hurricane Charley struck Florida in 2004, some hotels
lowered their rates, allowed pets into rooms in which they were not usually allowed and gave
free food to hungry guests.7 This diversity of reactions suggests that suppliers vary in their
altruism. In normal times, this variety may be hidden because relatively sel¯sh suppliers
gain little by charging more than their more altruistic brethren. After a natural disaster,
however, the bene¯ts of charging a pro¯t maximizing price may be quite substantial. Thus,
the extent to which ¯rms are genuinely altruistic stands revealed. As suggested by the title
of a story that ran in September 2004 in the Deseret Morning News,, \Disasters reveal the
stu® we're truly made of."
Consistent with Rotemberg's (2004) model, the set of people who become angry at ¯rms
that have purchased a brand's product in the past (in the sense of allocating \points" to it), reduce these
purchases if this brand o®ers a discount to new customers. They also show that subjects that used to
purchase brand b reduce their purchases of this brand if brand a o®ers a discount to its past customers.
They see this as being driven by \jealousy," though this e®ect might also be due to an assessment that brand
b is not su±ciently altruistic in its promotion strategy.
7See \Hotels treated guests like family," St. Petersburg Times, August 18, 2004.
13who raise prices is not limited to those that actually end up paying more. Indeed, the loaded
expression \price gouging," which is widely used in this context, suggests that many people
view these price increases as an a®ront. In an editorial of the Miami Herald, Associate Editor
Martha Musgrove gives further expression to her anger and says \I'd like to punch out those
price-gouging creeps."8
2 Price setting anomalies
2.1 All you can eat
It is fairly common for ¯rms to o®er price schedules where customers pay a \¯xed fee"
that does not depend on their level of consumption and, in exchange, face a zero cost per
unit. What makes this pattern of prices surprising is that it occurs in settings where, as
in the health club example of Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004, 2006), marginal cost is
strictly positive. This seems problematic in that it seems to provide ine±cient incentives
to consume more than what is socially optimal.9 It also implies that people who plan to
consumer relatively little are subsidizing those who plan to consume a great deal. Firm's
embrace of this adverse selection is peculiar because one would expect those who plan to
consume a great deal to have a larger willingness to pay.
In discussing pricing of health clubs, Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004) suggest a so-
phisticated e±ciency rationale for this pattern of prices. They suppose that health club
visits are \investment goods" that reduce utility on the day that they take place and in-
crease utility only in the future. They further suppose that individuals discount the future
hyperbolically. This means that, looking just three periods ahead for simplicity, individuals
at t care about ut + ¯±ut+1 + ¯±2ut+2 where u¿ is the level of utility at ¿ while ¯ and ± are
parameters that lie strictly between 0 and 1. When these individuals stand at t, an increase
8Miami Herald, September 1, 1992.
9These incentives are absent in the Barro and Romer (1987) analysis of ski-lift pricing because they
assume that ¯rms operate at a capacity constraint (though their analysis would of course be equally valid
when ski areas operate at less than full capacity as long as marginal cost were zero) so that consumers are
unable to increase total output.
14by one unit of utility at t + 2 is worth a sacri¯ce of ± units of utility at t + 1. In the gym
example, Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004) suppose that the bene¯ts at t + 2 of a visit
are larger than the sum of the disutility of the visit at t + 1 and the social marginal cost of
the visit at t + 1.
Because this individual has time inconsistent (and \present biased") preferences, he max-
imizes ut+1 + ¯±ut+2 at t + 1. A unit of extra utility at t + 2 is now worth only the sacri¯ce
of ¯± units of utility at t + 1. As a result, the individual may no longer be willing to incur
the personal disutility of a visit to the gym plus its social marginal cost even if he sees the
same increase in ut+2 from this visit. From the perspective of the period t \self", it makes
sense to trick the period t+1 self into going to the gym by arti¯cially facing the period t+1
self with a low price for the visit. The contract with a zero price thus acts as a commitment
device that leads people to do things that they would wish to do at t but are unwilling to
do at t + 1.
In the health club case, the assumptions of Della Vigna and Malmendier (2004) are rea-
sonable, though many health clubs users seem to enjoy their visits. There are, however, other
examples of ¯rms charging a zero marginal price for costly services where these assumptions
seem less natural. Club Med, for example, also charges a ¯xed fee for a period of time and
charges nothing for many activities, meals and drinks. If people had the \present biased"
preferences discussed above, they would overconsume food and drink at t+1 (when they are
on vacation) relative to their desires at t (when they are booking the vacation). With these
preferences, the period t self would like to impose arti¯cially high prices for these activities
at period t+1. Nonetheless, just as in the health club case, people seem to like the \all you
can eat" aspect of Club Med pricing. This preference is also manifest in car rental contracts,
where marginal (mileage) charges used to be common and their relevance has waned over
time.
The ubiquitousness of this practice suggests the desirability of a more general explanation
than the one provided above. Two explanations readily suggest themselves. This ¯rst, which
is mentioned by Della Vigna and Malmendier (2006) as well, is that people are overcon¯dent
15about their tendency to use particular services. Instances where services at priced at zero
marginal price lead lots of consumers to feel that they will bene¯t disproportionately, even
if they know that the average consumer does not bene¯t.
The second is that people dislike facing tradeo®s between paying a price and consuming,
they prefer to avoid the recurrence of \purchasing decisions" by making one decision at the
beginning. Consistent with this, Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) show survey evidence that,
for a variety of goods including health clubs and food during cruises, more people prefer
to pay such a ¯xed fee than a \per-use" fee even if the total cost and usage is the same.
This explanation still leaves open the question of why metering is so distasteful. Prelec and
Loewenstein provide an explanation based on mental accounts. Another possibility is that
the use of a single ¯xed fee reduces people's cognitive load by cutting down on both the
need to carry out calculations regarding whether an additional purchase is worthwhile and
regarding whether a particular purchase (or mile driven) will lead to future regret for having
paid too much. In the gym example, a customer might worry that she will face a regret-prone
decision on those occasions where she has only a limited time available for a visit to the gym.
In the example of vacation packages, a customer might worry that attending a hotel whose
price does not include meals will lead to regret about the chosen hotel when a meal proves to
be expensive. This concern might be particularly acute if the hotel is in a remote location,
which is common for Club Med properties.
It might be thought that a consumer who pays a ¯xed fee may be subject to same kind of
regret if he ends up using the service relatively little. One advantage of the ¯xed fee, however,
is that the consumer is unlikely to know how much his actual pattern of visits would have
cost under a per-use payments scheme (because he is unlikely to recall either the amount
he has used the service or the per-use charge under alternative contracts). By contrast, a
customer using a per-use contract runs the risk of regretting his marginal transaction and is
much more likely to be aware of its price.10
10This regret-based explanation is not so much an alternative to the \mental accounts" hypothesis of
Prelec and Loewenstein (1998) as a potential reason why people creating mental accounts in the ¯rst place.
One advantage of carrying mental accounts for di®erent categories of consumption is that, if one does so
16While there is still no consensus on what determines whether a price is fair, a zero
marginal price presumably also lowers the computational burden needed to decide whether
a price is fair or not. There may thus be a connection between people's desire for fair prices
(and their extreme displeasure at being confronted with unfair ones) and their desire to enter
into agreements that cut marginal prices to zero.
2.2 Price endings
Consistent with consumer's attraction to purchasing goods whose price ends with a 9, ¯rms
use this price ending extensively. Twedt (1965) and Levy et al. (2007) use quite di®erent
samples and ¯nd that over half the prices they observe end in the digit 9. One explanation
for this behavior is that consumers absorb price information from left to right and recall
only the ¯rst few signi¯cant digits. If this were true, one might expect consumers to be more
confused when a price ends with several 9s, so that prices ending with several 9s would be
particularly common.
Interestingly, Schindler and Kirby (1997) show that ¯rms are less likely to charge a price
ending in a zero rather than a slightly lower price ending in 9 if the latter leads the price
to end in several nines. In other words, prices ending in zero where reductions by one unit
would lead a digit that is three positions to the left to fall are particularly rare relative to
prices ending in 9. This suggests that ¯rms ¯nd it particularly di±cult to resist lowering
price by one unit when the this a®ects a relatively important leftmost digit. This strategy
seems particularly well designed to take advantage of consumers that only react to the ¯rst
few digits.
Levy et al. (2007) connect the behavior of price endings with the behavior of price
changes. They show that prices ending in 9 are less likely to be changed than prices ending
in other digits while, at the same time, the typical size of price changes is larger for prices
ending in 9. It thus follows that ¯rms are less attached to 9 endings so that 9 endings
successfully, they may eliminate regret from marginal purchases in a category as long as total purchases
within the category are within the amount budgeted in the mental account.
17are \more sticky." Still, and perhaps surprisingly, the distribution of price endings has not
converged to a degenerate distribution, other price endings continue to be used for many
products. Since not all price changes are multiples of 10, this means that some products go
from having a price ending in 9 to a price ending with another digit. The conditions under
which this occurs are deserving of further study. I now discuss price changes more generally.
2.3 The amplitude and timing of price changes
Commodities that trade in open exchanges have prices that vary frequently, often from
transaction to transaction. Since essentially every industrial good contains some commodities
that are traded on these exchanges, the marginal cost of producing these goods varies as well.
Nonetheless, ¯nal goods prices are rather rigid relative to the prices of raw commodities.
The standard reason that is given for this rigidity is that there are administrative costs
associated with publicizing new prices and with modifying the equipment that ensures that
consumers pay a di®erent amount for the units that they buy.11 In this subsection, I ¯rst
discuss a variety of empirical regularities that cast doubt on the idea that, by themselves,
administrative costs of this type can explain the price rigidity we observe. I then turn to a
more tentative treatment of why the consumer non-rationalities discussed above may help
explain the pattern of price rigidity that we observe.
With administrative costs of changing prices that are independent of the size of price
changes, Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) as well as Golosov and Lucas (2007) show that there
is a \band of inaction". In other words, ¯rms keep their price constant if it falls between an
upper and a lower threshold price. In the case covered by Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), there
is constant in°ation, and the two thresholds s and S are ¯xed. When in°ation erodes the
¯rm's real price to the point that it equals s, the ¯rm raises its real price to S, only to see
the real price being eroded again. Golosov and Lucas (2007) consider a more complicated
setting where ¯rms are also subject to idiosyncratic shocks. Nonetheless, the basic logic of
11See Sheshinski and Weiss (1977) for an early formalization of this idea and Golosov and Lucas (2007)
for a recent one.
18the Sheshisnki and Weiss (1977) analysis carries through, with the ¯rm raising its price by
a discrete amount whenever history has left the ¯rm with a price that is too low.
If the ¯rm is setting its price optimally, two things must be true about this band of
inaction. The ¯rst is that, during the period in which the ¯rm expects its price to be
constant, the expected discounted value of the change in pro¯ts from raising the price slightly
must be zero. The second is that pro¯ts after the adjustment must exceed pro¯ts before the
adjustment by the time value of money of the adjustment cost. The reason is that the ¯rm
can always delay adjustment for a short while and thereby save the time value of money on
its adjustment cost, and must thus be compensated for this by an increase in pro¯ts when
it does adjust its price.
As shown in Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), this implies that an increase in in°ation must
necessarily lead to an increase in the size of price increases S ¡ s. To see this, consider a
¯rm that keeps its band of inaction constant after in°ation rises. An increase in in°ation
then implies that the ¯rm reaches prices near the lower bound s more quickly than before.
Since pro¯ts increase with price when the price is relatively low, this means that the present
discounted value of the bene¯ts of raising price becomes positive when in°ation rises. This
tends to push up S, the price after adjustment. Since S is always larger than the pro¯t
maximizing price, pro¯ts at SR fall when S is increased. Finally, since the level of pro¯ts
before adjustment needs to stay in the same relation to the pro¯ts after adjustment, the
price before adjustment must decline. So, S rises and s falls, and S ¡s unambiguously rises.
Rotemberg (2004) demonstrates that, for plausible parameter values, this e®ect of in-
°ation on the size of price increases is quite substantial. In particular, it is much larger
than the actual increase in the size of price increases one observes when comparing low to
high in°ation periods. One of the most striking and robust facts reported by researchers
who have studied price adjustment in both low and high in°ation periods is that the size
of price increases barely rises even if in°ation rises substantially. This ¯nding is present in
Cecchetti (1986), in Lach and Tsiddon (1992), in Goette et al. (2005), in Gagnon (2006)
and in Wulfsberg and Ballangrud (2007). The Gagnon (2006) study of Mexican data and
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cause they show that the typical size of price increases actually rose (instead of falling) after
in°ation dropped in the 1990's and the 1980's respectively. This inability of a model with
administrative costs of changing prices to account for changes in the size of price increases
seems like a substantial drawback.
An equally serious drawback was pointed out by Carlton (1986) and Kashyap (1995).
They showed that the minimum size of price increases for the goods that they studied was
extremely small. This minimum increase is extremely important in models with administra-
tive costs because it must equal S ¡s and is small only if administrative costs are unimpor-
tant. Thus, a ¯nding of small price increases suggests that the costs of price increases must
be trivial at least for some goods.
I have talked so far about models with administrative costs of changing prices because
these have proper \micro-foundations" in that they derive price rigidity from an appealing
and simple underlying friction. In applied macroeconomics, it is actually more common to
simply assume that each ¯rm has a constant probability of changing its price in each time
period.12 This assumption is due to Calvo (1983), and leads the aggregate price level to
behave as if ¯rms had costs of changing prices that are quadratic in the size of the price
change, as in Rotemberg (1982). Taken literally, the Rotemberg (1982) model implies that
each ¯rm changes its prices by a small amount each period, which is counter to evidence.
Unfortunately, when taken literally, the Calvo (1983) model is also inconsistent with ev-
idence at the ¯rm level.13 As shown by Gagnon (2006), Nakamura and Steinsson (2007)
and Wulfsberg and Ballangrud (2007), the fraction of ¯rms changing their price is not at
12As shown by Gertler and Leahy (2006), if idiosyncratic shocks are su±ciently large and recurrent, ¯rms
with administrative costs of changing prices will mostly change their prices in response to such idiosyncratic
shocks. Thus, the probability of a price change will be essentially constant if the distribution of idiosyncratic
shocks is constant.
13While these models do not describe the literal behavior of individual ¯rms, they are both tractable
and capture two essential features of sticky prices. The ¯rst is that this stickiness increases the correlation
of current and past prices. The second is that, if ¯rms are forward looking, the rigidity of prices leads
current prices to be more correlated with the future determinants of prices. In spite of their imperfections at
describing micro phenomena, these models may thus remain useful as vehicles for organizing macroeconomic
data.
20all constant. Rather, the fraction of ¯rms raising prices increases with in°ation while the
fraction of ¯rms reducing prices is not closely related to in°ation so that the overall fraction
is procyclical.
If administrative costs of changing prices were the main impediment of price °exibility,
¯rms would presumably give this as their reason for keeping prices constant. This can be
checked by interviewing ¯rm managers who set prices, and several studies including Blinder
et al. (1988) and Fabiani et al. (2005) have done so. In these studies, managers do not
seem to put much weight on administrative costs when asked to explain why they keep their
prices constant for extended periods of time. What managers cite as the main reason for
price rigidity, instead, is that this avoids customer antagonism.
One issue that remains unsettled is whether a model where price rigidity is due to concerns
with customer emotion can account for these the two features of price changes discussed
earlier. One interesting model of this sort is provided by Heidhues and KÄ oszegi (2004).
They focus on consumers who become unwilling to buy a good if the price exceeds the price
that they expected to prevail. Consumers react in this manner because they are averse
to the loss associated with paying too much. The result is that ¯rms face a very elastic
demand for their product at the price that consumers expect to pay. This model has several
attractive features, including that it represents a relatively small departure from standard
economic models. Another bene¯t is that, while ¯rms are not reacting directly to the anger
that consumers feel, the model is quite consistent with consumers being very upset when
they encounter a price that does not match their expectations | since such a price leads
them to lose something relative to their expectation. What is less clear is whether this
model is consistent with the fact that many regular price changes seem to be associated with
insigni¯cant changes in purchases or whether it can explain the patterns of price changes
discussed above.
It is also not clear whether this pattern can be explained with models where consumers
get upset if the ¯rm acts sel¯shly as in Rotemberg (2004, 2005). Rotemberg (2004) shows
that one can at least explain the weakness of the relationship between the size of price
21increases and in°ation under reasonable assumptions about consumer regret. A consumer
facing a price that was recently increased regrets not having bought the good before its
price was raised. It is therefore plausible to suppose that these regret costs are larger when
price increases are larger. Firms that want to appear altruistic should then avoid large price
increases because these induce a great deal of regret. More importantly, such ¯rms should
not substantially increase the size of their price increases when in°ation is higher. The
reason is, in part, that a higher rate of in°ation implies that regret rises by more when a
¯rm postpones its price increase by one unit of time (since the resulting price increase will
have to be larger). The postponement of price increases thus become less attractive to a
¯rm that wishes to be seen as acting altruistically. Since this e®ect is larger when in°ation is
larger, it has a larger dampening e®ect on the size of price increases when in°ation is higher.
This still leaves the question of whether a model of this type can explain the fact that
so many price increases are small. One possibility, suggested by Rotemberg (2005) is that
there are occasions in which ¯rms become aware that small price increases would be par-
ticularly acceptable to customers. Given the simultaneous objectives of raising prices and
preventing customer anger, ¯rms may raise their prices by a small amount on these occa-
sions. Whether this mechanism can explain the frequency of small price increases deserves
continuing theoretical and empirical research.
3 High-low pricing
An obvious question raised by the reluctance of ¯rms to change their regular prices is why
so many retailers adopt a \Hi-Lo" strategy where goods are routinely put on special below
their \regular" level, rather than adopting an EDLP (everyday low pricing) strategy. EDLP
economizes on transaction (and menu) costs and some stores, Walmart in particular, are
supposedly successful with EDLP.14
One factor that may contribute to the pro¯tability of the Hi-Lo strategy is that people
14In fact, Hoch, Drµ eze and Purk (1994) show that stores that are known for EDLP also sell a high fraction
of their goods in special promotions, though these tend to be less deep than those at Hi-Lo stores.
22derive a great deal of personal satisfaction from purchasing bargains (see Darke and Dahl
2003 for evidence on this). Still, according to Hoch, Drµ eze and Purk (1994), only about a
quarter of the revenue of Hi-Lo stores consists of items that are being promoted. To study
the costs and bene¯ts of the Hi-Lo strategy, Hoch, Drµ eze and Purk (1994) ran an extensive
experiment using di®erent stores in the Dominick's supermarket chain. Some of these stores
increased their regular prices to pursue a Hi-Lo strategy while others lowered them to pursue
an aggressive EDLP strategy. The latter strategy was less pro¯table in the Hoch, Drµ eze and
Purk (1994) data because the reduction in prices had only a modest e®ect on demand. The
10 percent reduction in EDLP prices relative to those of control stores only raised unit
volume (in the category in which prices were reduced) by 3 percent.
Perhaps the most important overall conclusion of this study is that Hi-Lo stores manage
to sell a considerable volume of goods at non-promotional prices so that EDLP is quite
costly. This raises the obvious question of why customers do not regard the existence of high
\regular" prices as unfair. While this question remains unsettled, two observations are in
order. The ¯rst is that, as argued by Rotemberg (2004), regret may be kept relatively low
by specials whose duration is short and spelled out in advance. The reason is that, because
specials are temporary, people who become aware of the special take advantage of it. By
the same token, people who do not become aware of the special see only a relatively stable
\regular" price and they therefore do not know that there is a speci¯c opportunity that they
failed to take advantage of.
A second aspect of specials, is that the people who disproportionately take advantage
of them are \price sensitive" shoppers. Insofar as people who pay higher prices perceive
price sensitive shoppers as valuing money (or income) more highly, they may feel that an
altruistic ¯rm would indeed wish to o®er such individuals a better deal. Thus, specials, at
least in the form that they take in modern supermarkets, may be seen as less unfair than
other forms of unstable prices. As an illustration of these di®erences, Haws and Bearden
(2006) report that fairness perceptions depend on the amount of time that elapses between
the purchases of consumers that pay di®erent prices. People regard it as particularly unfair
23if another consumer obtains a lower price within an hour of their own purchase while price
di®erences separated by a month are less likely to be seen as unfair. At the very least, this
fact shows that ¯rms with rigid prices are less likely to upset their consumers by behaving
in ways that they regard as unfair.
4 Government price policies
The previous analysis suggests three behavioral elements of prices that are relevant for
policy. First, people appear to be confused by certain aspects of pricing, so they may
well make mistakes. Second, they see certain pricing practices as unfair and they react to
these with anger. Some ¯rms act so as to avert this anger, but others do not, so that this
anger is observed. Lastly, people who are not directly a®ected by prices share some of the
feelings of those who are, presumably because they empathize with them. Unfortunately,
these considerations mean that policy analysis is more di±cult than in the usual case where
people are rational decision makers who care only about their own bundles of consumption.
Indeed, relatively little is known in general about how policy should be conducted if people
make mistakes, experience regret both directly and vicariously, or get upset at people whose
behavior exacerbates regret.
I illustrate the complexities of the resulting welfare analysis by considering two policies
that are currently under discussion in the United States. Both of them involve interference
with the right to set prices freely, both already have the force of law, and there appears to be
widespread support for expanding the scope of these laws. The ¯rst of these policies forbids
¯rms from raising prices in emergencies while the second limits the contractual terms that
can be o®ered when people borrow to purchase their primary residences.
In standard economic models, these interventions lead to Pareto suboptimal allocations
so everyone's welfare can be increased by freeing prices and making lump sum transfers.
As I discuss below, the presence of regret, anger and empathy make it harder to increase
everyone's welfare in this manner. The analysis also reveals who gains and who loses from
these policies and thus makes clear why it is possible for them to be supported by a majority
24of the population. By doing so, the analysis may also shed light on the elements of these
policies that people see as particularly desirable, and this might help improve their design.
The section ends by discussing monetary policy and in°ation. Because the analysis of
in°ation when people have the concerns that are explored in this paper is still in its infancy,
this section is mostly conjectural. Still, the psychological issues stressed in this paper may
help explain why in°ation is so widely disliked.
4.1 Anti price gouging legislation
As of September 2005, 28 states in the U.S.A. had laws against \price gouging." These
statutes outlawed certain price increases during periods in which government authorities
declared a state of emergency or during periods of \market disruption." The details of
these laws di®ered, with some states treating o®enses as a criminal violations subject to jail
while others treated them as civil o®enses subject only to ¯nes. The existing laws often
exempted price increases based on cost and outlawed only \excessive" or \unconscionable"
price increases. Connecticut, Oklahoma and West Virginia each forbade price increases that
exceeded 10% from the pre-emergency period, though they di®ered in the range of products
that were covered by this requirement. In 2006 and 2007, there was also an e®ort to impose
federal anti-gouging legislation speci¯cally targeted at oil products.
States with anti-gouging legislation tended to make it easy for consumers to lodge com-
plaints. During the hurricane emergencies of 2004-2006, the Florida Attorney General dealt
with about 13,000 such complaints. Many of these were resolved quickly and there were only
81 formal investigations, which resulted in 17 lawsuits. Several of these lawsuits resulted
in businesses paying restitution and ¯nes.15 For example, the West Palm Days Inn, which
charged guests up to $144 in spite of having a nearby billboard advertising rooms for $49.99,
agreed to pay $70,000. This was supposed to pay for the investigation, with $10,000 set
aside to compensate hotel guests, and the rest being directed to Florida Hurricane Relief
15See \Few Suits in cases of price gouging," St. Petersburg Times, August 16, 2006.
25Fund.16 Similarly, a Honda dealer that sold electric generators in Long Island for 67% above
the normal price after a 1985 hurricane was ordered to give refunds to its customers and was
¯ned $5000.17
Anti price-gouging laws were billed by their supporters as protecting consumers. In intro-
ducing federal anti-gouging legislation, Senator Joseph Lieberman (Democrat, Connecticut)
said: \This law is necessary because there is really nothing available to protect consumers
and businesses from being gouged."18 The idea that price controls \protect" consumers
seems incompatible with standard economic models. In a competitive market, prices below
the market clearing level lead to an ine±cient allocation of scarce goods among consumers
who value them di®erently and yield an insu±cient incentive to bring more goods to the
market. So, consumers as a whole are clearly hurt. It should be noted, however, that these
deleterious e®ects may be relatively modest if prices are temporarily held near their pre-
emergency level for a short time. The reason is that the people buying critical goods during
emergencies may all need them a great deal so the problem of ine±cient allocation across
consumers may be small. Similarly, the pre-emergency price may still maintain a reasonable
incentive to bring goods to the a®ected area.
Nonetheless, there is little doubt that some ine±ciency arises during the period where
price increases are capped, raising the political economy question of why such caps have
political support. This is an important question because it casts doubt on the idea that
people's reaction to prices is encapsulated by the standard model in which sel¯sh consumers
react rationally to prices as signals of scarcity. If people were purely sel¯sh, this political
mobilization should be championed by its direct bene¯ciaries. But who are the bene¯ciaries
here? The a®ected ¯rms lose money so they should organize against these laws and, according
to the view that ¯rms ¯nd it easier to organize than consumers, they should win and keep
such legislation at bay. Some consumers do bene¯t by paying lower prices, but others lose
by being rationed. Thus, if the traditional model of consumer preferences were valid, it is
16See West Palm Days Inn Settles Storm Gouging Suit, Tampa Tribune, October 4, 2004.
17New York Times, October 1, 1990.
18New York Times, October 1, 1990.
26not entirely clear whether consumers as a whole could expect to gain from this legislation.
Even assuming that consumers come out ahead, it would seem that the traditional model
has no explanation for why consumers organize to keep prices low in this particular case,
rather than organizing to lower prices in more normal times.19
One possibility is that policymakers and the public at large are confused about the op-
eration of markets. This interpretation is unappealing because economists have written a
large number of editorials on the topic, begging the question of why the standard economic
arguments have been so unpersuasive in the past. Since these arguments do not seem com-
plicated, an inability to comprehend them would seem to bode poorly for people's capacity
to make rational decisions.
A rather di®erent possibility is that people understand the economic arguments full
well but that they do not ¯nd them compelling. Some evidence for this can be found
in the pages of the Miami Herald of September 1, 1992 where Martin Ho®man gave the
standard economic arguments against anti-price gouging legislation and Associate Editor
Martha Musgrove forcefully rejected them. From this and the earlier discussion of consumer
reactions to price increases, we can conclude two things. First, people who face price increases
during emergencies are upset, with their utility loss exceeding the ¯nancial burden of having
to pay a higher price. Second, some people who are not directly a®ected by the price increase
are also furious at the \gougers" who raise their price during the emergency.
These two factors reduce the social bene¯ts from letting prices rise after an emergency.
Indeed, the existence of regret and anger make it di±cult to achieve Pareto improvements
from the outcome with anti-gouging legislation even if transfers are allowed. Without trans-
fers, individual losses from the abandonment of anti-gouging legislation are larger still.
To see this, consider a setting where we would normally expect such legislation to be
Pareto suboptimal. Suppose that a law of this type forces a ¯rm to charge a price p for a
19The implausibility that sel¯sh considerations lead to political mobilization in this setting may also cast
some doubt of its importance in other settings where observers have been quick to presume that self-interest
is responsible for government-induced ine±ciency. See Rotemberg (2002) for a discussion of these issues in
the context of tari®s.
27hotel room that ends up being occupied by a person to whom it is worth x > p. Moreover,
suppose that there are two additional people to whom the room is worth y > x and that
they are both rationed. Suppose, further that an additional room could have been obtained
at a cost y so that a price of y would have led both the people who value the room more
highly to have obtained lodging.
In the conventional analysis, we reach a Pareto improvement by charging y for the 2
rooms and giving the person to whom it is worth x a transfer slightly larger than x ¡ p.
To ¯nd the people with willingness to pay y, this improvement requires that the price y be
charged for the rooms. But, as soon as y is charged, everyone who sees the higher price
(all three potentially customers) su®er the non-pecuniary losses that are triggered by the
di®erence between y and p. Let these losses equal `. They can be thought as the costs of the
regret of not having bought the good earlier at p. Alternatively, one can imagine that the
\reference price" p is particularly salient in a natural disaster with people feeling relatively
acute pain when they spend more for a hotel room than they would have in normal times.
Those observing the situation, meanwhile, are upset if the hotel keeper is receiving y
rather than p. We could relieve the observers of some of their anger by charging y but
giving the hotel keeper only p and using the proceeds for charity. This ¯ts with Campbell's
(1999) demonstration that the auctioning of a desirable Barbie doll during Chrismas is more
acceptable if the proceeds go to charity. But this would not be su±cient to induce the hotel
keeper to bring the second room to the market. For that, we would have to pay her y, at
least for the second room.
Leaving the problem of the anger at the hotel owner aside, we can only make all customers
as well o® as they were with the anti-gouging law if we give all three of them `. Once we
do that, the money left over after the two room occupants pay y may not be su±cient to
compensate for the cost of the extra room y, plus the price the hotel room received initially
p plus the gain to the initial room occupant x ¡ p. In other words, y ¡ 3` may be less than
x. The impediment to reaching a Pareto improvement (even in the presence of transfers) is
that the process of identifying the person who is willing to pay the most is directly costly
28to other consumers. Without transfers, of course, simply raising the price is not a Pareto
improvement, since there is at least one customer who is worse o® if x > p.
In this example, one could argue that the two rationed customers bene¯t from freeing
prices and that, since the hotel owner gains also, a majority of the agents is better o®. Even
if people who value the good at y are better o® because the regret costs ` are relatively low,
a majority could still favor anti-gouging legislation. This would occur if there existed a large
number of people who purchased the room at both the old and the new price since each of
these would lose ` in addition to the price di®erence. It would also occur if the anger induced
by the hotel that raises prices is counted su±ciently in social welfare.
4.2 \Suitability" criteria for mortgages
According to Persky (2007), the idea that emergencies should lead lenders with other-
regarding preferences to loan at zero interest was central to the medieval prohibition against
usury. Persky (2007) quotes a 1572 text by Thomas Wilson saying: \lend to your poore
neighbors in time of their great need" and \[lending] shoulde be ...free, simple, and for
charityes sake ...without anye thinge at all more than the principall." Persky (2007) fur-
ther suggests that charging positive interest only became socially acceptable as ¯rms gained
productive opportunities that made it easy for them to repay such loans. The debate over
limits on interest rates continues to this day. My focus here, however, is on a very speci¯c set
of regulations concerning loans, namely limitations on contracts that allow people to borrow
using their principal residence as collateral.
In the Unites States, the bulk of the federal regulations concerning credit to consumers
involves the requirements for disclosure imposed by the 1968 Truth in Lending Act and its
subsequent revisions. An important and interesting exception to this emphasis on informa-
tion, is provided by the 1994 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), which
sets limits on the contractual terms of \high cost" mortgages. Mortgages that are classi¯ed
as high cost either on the basis of high interest rates or high up-front fees are not allowed to
contain penalties if the borrower pays down the principal before it is due nor are they allowed
29to have the principal grow over time (i.e., have negative amortization).20 In addition, lenders
who o®er such loans are not allowed to engage in a \pattern or practice of extending credit
...to a consumer based on the consumers collateral without regard to the consumers repay-
ment ability."21 In this section, I analyze whether the psychological considerations stressed
in this paper rationalize restrictions of this type.
The \endowment e®ect" of Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1990) leads people to de-
mand a higher price to part with an object they already have than they are willing to pay to
acquire the same object. This attachment to objects that one \owns," suggests that people
who lose their house through foreclosure su®er enormous pain. Moreover, the desire to help
people in these circumstances suggests that this pain elicits empathy.
The recent escalation of subprime mortgage defaults in the United States begs the ques-
tion of how so many individuals reached the point where they stood such a high probability
of losing something that is so valuable to them. One obvious possibility that is consistent
with the cognitive di±culties in my earlier discussion is that overcon¯dent individuals may
have been particularly prone to enter into such contracts. A related possibility is that this
population of borrowers proved easy to manipulate by brokers who posed as their friends.
For purposes of discussion, consider a very stark case where, for one reason or another, some
people make such mistakes.
Let there be only two periods (labeled 0 and 1) and a person I will call A who believes
that he derives total expected utility ¹ u0+¯¹ u1 if he does not borrow. Thus, ¹ u0 and ¹ u1 denote
his baseline levels of expected utility and ¯ denotes his discount rate. Lets suppose that
A is o®ered a loan backed by his principal residence and that this individual believes that
accepting this loan will lead to levels of expected utility ^ u0 and ^ u1 in the two periods. This
person thus accepts the loan if he believes that (^ u0 +¯^ u1) exceeds (¹ u0 +¯¹ u1). Indeed, if one
took a revealed preference viewpoint, one would conclude that (^ u0 +¯^ u1) ¸ (¹ u0 +¯¹ u1) from
20See Ho and Pennington-Cross (2007) for a description of the numerous state laws that strengthen HOEPA
either by changing the high cost trigger or by curtailing speci¯c practices including the use of \balloon"
payments when the mortgage comes to an end.
21US Code 15, 1639(h)
30the observation that A took the loan.
Now consider an observer (possibly an econometrician armed with data and a model,
possibly a friend) who agrees with the assessments ¹ u0, ¹ u1 and ^ u0, so that she has no quarrel
with the baseline levels of utility or the extra time zero utility from consuming the proceeds
from the loan. The observer believes, however, that expected utility at time 1 with the
loan equals ~ u1 < ^ u1. In other words, she believes that there is a good probability that the
individual will lose his house, experience regret and be extremely unhappy. If (¹ u0 + ¯¹ u1) <
(^ u1 + ¯~ u1), this observer believes that A is better o® not borrowing.
Now consider an ideal mortgage limitation that prevents A, and only A, from taking on
this loan. The conventional analysis gives credence to the utility function that is consistent
with A's actions, and thus sees this prohibition as ine±cient because it makes both A and
the lender worse o®. One might, instead, use either the utility function of the observer or,
equivalently, the expectation of a social planner of the true long run utility of A.22 This
point of view is somewhat problematic because there is at least one moment in time where
A believes that this prohibition makes him worse o®, though there may well be other times
(particularly in period 1) where A is in fact better o®.23
Even if one is willing to evaluate A's welfare using A's assessment of utility, the existence
of empathy can still make the outcome with the loan prohibition Pareto optimal. Suppose, in
particular, that observers have a utility function that puts a weight of ¸ on their perception
of the utility of potential borrowers. In other words, observers \put themselves in A's shoes"
but use their own assessments of utility when they do so. Then each loan received by people
with the characteristics of A is costly to these outside observers if (¹ u0 + ¯¹ u1) > (^ u0 + ¯~ u1).
These costs are experienced mostly in period 1 but observers already anticipate them as of
period 0. To obtain a Pareto improvement from the outcome reached with the prohibition,
it is thus necessary to compensate observers at some point for these losses. Even if A and
22This is similar to the perspective of Gruber and KÄ oszegi (2001) who compute social welfare by assigning
their \long-run preferences" to time-inconsistent smokers.
23A libertarian might further claim that A himself is made worse o® by the simple act of restricting his
choice.
31the lender feel that they are better o® when the loan is allowed, their subjective gains may
not be su±cient to compensate these observers for their vicarious losses.
There also may exist outside observers that are upset by the behavior of the lenders
that loan to A. The widespread use of the pejorative term \predatory lending,"24 already
suggests that many people regard certain lending practices as morally reprehensible. The
activist organization ACORN has gone further and adopted the chant \predatory lenders,
criminal o®enders."25
While the evidence that people dislike \predatory lending" seems strong, di®erent people
(not all of whom may be equally opposed to the same lending practices) use the term
quite di®erently. In 2000, HUD and the US Treasury Department published a report called
\Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage Lending," where this term was de¯ned in terms of
speci¯c practices. These included, the use of high fees of which borrowers were unaware,
frequent re¯nancing so as to collect fees repeatedly as well as other forms of fraud. The report
also objected to loans that were made without attention to borrower's ability to repay, where
such loans could only be pro¯table if the home was eventually foreclosed. While agreeing that
predatory lending is based on fraud, the California Association of Mortgage Brokers de¯nes
predatory lending as \intentionally placing consumers in loan products with signi¯cantly
worse terms and/or higher costs than loans o®ered to similarly quali¯ed consumers in the
region."26 Lastly, and most closely related to the discussion above, mortgagenewsdaily.com
de¯nes loans as predatory if they do not bene¯t the borrower.27
This last de¯nition has the advantage of ¯tting with the idea that customers demand
a minimal level of altruism from ¯rms. A lender that bene¯ts marginally from providing
a loan whose borrower can be expected to lose a great deal of utility might well be seen
24There were over 1 million entries for this term on Google as of July 2007.
25Kansas City Star, June, 7, 2007.
26See http://www.cambweb.org
27http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/Mortgage Fraud/Predatory Lending.asp. These de¯nitions are re-
lated in that, for example, fraudulent loans do not bene¯t borrowers. These de¯nitions are not identical,
however, in that a borrower might well not bene¯t from a loan even if its interest rate is properly \risk-based."
What matters, of course, is not how di®erent people de¯ne the concept but which aspects of lending induce
the most revulsion. Empirical research on what upsets people about di®erent loans is urgently needed.
32as not having this minimal required altruism. Because transactions in lending markets are
not repeated, the anger of past customers is not very e®ective at keeping lenders in check
(particularly in comparison with the e®ect of potential anger on suppliers of food items that
are purchased regularly). It is thus not surprising that anger at lenders spills over into the
policy arena.
Whether this interpretation of the source of anger is warranted or not, it is hard to
dismiss the importance of this anger for policy analysis. Angry individuals get utility from
the punishment in°icted on those that make them angry. So, one could argue that a law
that criminalises behavior that induces anger has a direct positive e®ect on the ex post
utility of angry individuals. More importantly, the elimination of anger-inducing behavior
seems useful for social cohesion. In the absence of well-de¯ned social welfare functions that
incorporate this concern, one might wish to treat anger as a loss that can be triggered by
contracts among third parties, and is thus a kind of externality.
Even if one accepts both that overt proofs of limited altruism cause anger as in Rotemberg
(2007), and that lending terms that are seen by outside observers as harming borrowers are
seen as signs of insu±cient altruism,28 there is still the question of which practices should
be forbidden. One advantage of limiting pre-payment penalties and negative amortization
is that these features of mortgages may be ones that unsophisticated borrowers do not
understand at the time they sign these contracts. Particularly for mortgages with \teaser
rates," borrowers may not realize that the existence of prepayment penalties will prevent
them from re¯nancing cheaply once the period of low rates expires. Similarly, borrowers
of negative amortization mortgages may be lulled into complacency by the a®ordability of
monthly payments without noticing that their main payments lie in the future. Thus, the
elimination of these practices may prevent borrowers from signing contracts that ultimately
cost them their house.
28Competition among lenders, so that their margins are low implies that their altruism must be particularly
low if they are wiling to impose large costs on borrowers. This need not imply that monopoly lenders will be
seen as more altruistic if they extend such loans because their monopoly status should lead them to value
the marginal utility of poor borrowers highly relative to their own.
33On the other hand, these limitations also make it more di±cult to borrow for some
individuals whose risk of default is low. Pre-payment penalties, for example, should reduce
interest rates and make mortgages more a®ordable at ¯rst, with this bene¯t to the borrower
being o®set by a reduction in the likelihood of re¯nancing when interest rates drop. Negative
amortization mortgages, meanwhile, may well be very useful for borrowers that expect their
income to rise over time. Rather than forbidding practices that might be advantageous to
borrowers, it would seem more desirable to target only those loans that are likely to end in
tears. In the case of housing loans, the pain is likely to be particularly acute for those whose
loan ends in foreclosure.
It thus seems attractive to require lenders to compute the probability that a loan will
end in this manner, with penalties attached when this computation is not credible. Since
regulators and credit agencies also care about these probabilities (albeit for di®erent rea-
sons), widely acceptable models for computing them should become available. These models
would obviously integrate features of mortgages such as prepayment penalties and negative
amortization, both of which could raise the probability of default.
Once mortgage originators are forced to compute these probabilities, there are two dif-
ferent regulatory regimes that can be envisaged. In the ¯rst, lenders would be required to
disclose the results of this computation to borrowers. In the second, borrowers would simply
not be allowed to sign loans whose probability of ending in foreclosure exceeds some critical
number. The former solution would seem preferable except for the fact that naive borrowers
might not take the warning implicit in these calculations seriously.
4.3 The rationale for low in°ation
Anti price gouging legislation and limitations on mortgages are controversial policies. By
contrast, there is substantially more agreement that in°ation should typically be low. The
question I tackle here is why this consensus is so strong. One reason that °ows directly
from the earlier analysis is that in°ation increases consumer regret. The reason it does so is
that in°ation increases the frequency with which prices rise, and each price increase has the
34potential to lead consumers to wish they had bought the good earlier. Thus, a policy of low
in°ation lowers regret, and thereby increases well-being.
Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001) demonstrate that, indeed, in°ation reduces
reported \life satisfaction." Equally remarkable is the fact that, in opinion polls, in°ation
has historically often been seen as the most serious problem faced by the United States.
Fischer and Huizinga (1982) display Gallup Poll data showing that there were more people
seeing in°ation as a more serious problem than unemployment in 1951, when in°ation was
about 6% and unemployment about 3.3%. While the rank of the two problems reversed in
the late 1950's and early 1960's, in°ation became more important once again starting in the
middle 1960's, when it was equal to about 3.5%. Hibbs (1979) computes the determinants of
the relative importance of these two issues. His conclusion is that, when the unemployment
rate is unchanging, more than 50% of respondents see in°ation as a more serious problem
than unemployment as long as in°ation exceeds 6%.
The question is whether the depth of people's concern for in°ation would make sense if
people cared about prices only in the manner that is standard in economic models. In other
words, could consumers who see prices exclusively as indicators of what they can a®ord be
as perturbed by in°ation? In°ation is known to have two consequences. The ¯rst is that
it leads people to economize on money balances. However, because total expenditure on
money balances are modest, this e®ect should be modest as well.
The second is that in°ation increases the volatility of relative prices because di®erent
¯rms do not adjust their prices at the same time. From the point of view of conventional
welfare measurement, Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) show that this is an important reason
to keep in°ation low. What is less clear is that this explains why typical consumers want
in°ation to be low.
To see this, it is worth recalling that for ¯xed real income in terms of a particular good,
volatility of prices is actually good for consumers. Even with dispersed relative prices,
consumers can a®ord the bundle they would buy if all prices were set at their mean levels.
Consumers can do even better, though, by tailoring purchases to the particular pattern of
35relative prices that they face. The volatility and dispersion of relative prices induced by
in°ation can therefore only hurt consumers if it reduces their mean real income.
As it happens, in°ation does reduce real income for a given level of employment. The
reason is that those ¯rms that charge a low price sell more since ¯rm output is determined
by demand. This this reduces the average income of ¯rms, and indirectly that of workers.
Moreover, diminishing returns implies that the ¯rms that sell more have lower labor pro-
ductivity, so that price dispersion across ¯rms implies that a disproportionate fraction of
goods is produced by ¯rms whose productivity is relatively low. These e®ects reduce real
income for a given level of employment and thereby imply also that in°ation raises the level
of employment that is needed to produce a given level of real income. This required increase
in work e®ort (and reduction of leisure) is the reason why Rotemberg and Woodford (1997)
¯nd in°ation reducing welfare even for given GDP. What is not implied by this analysis is
that people will be aware that in°ation is reducing GDP for a given level of employment, and
much less that this is the reason they dislike in°ation. Indeed, the opinion polls analyzed by
Fischer and Huizinga (1982) suggest that consumers do not regard in°ation as having had
a major e®ect on their real income. Rather, what bothers them about in°ation seems to be
something else.
5 Conclusions
This paper has considered three psychological reactions to prices. The ¯rst is that consumers
are unmindful of them. The second is that they experience regret when they discover that
they have paid more than they could have if they had acted di®erently in the past. The third
is that they are upset when they see prices they deem unfair. I have tried to connect these
reactions by noting that regret can be enhanced if consumers do not pay close attention to
prices, and that feelings of regret can cause anger if consumers conclude that the ¯rms were
not su±ciently empathetic towards consumers' regret.
These reactions complicate the price setting problem of ¯rms. On the one hand, con-
sumer naivete opens up many opportunities for exploiting consumers. On the other hand,
36consumers can become angry when they see ¯rms that seem uncaring in their willingness
to cause regret. In some cases, this potential for anger is su±cient to discipline ¯rms. The
result is that certain pricing patterns can be explained as attempts to avoid this anger.
At the same time, however, it is clear that some ¯rms are willing to anger their customers,
particularly in the event of natural disasters. Similarly, consumers are upset when lenders
contribute to the loss of other people's homes. This paper suggests that these reactions can
explain why consumers seek legislation that limits price freedom in credit markets and in
markets where emergencies suddenly raise demand. The paper also shows that such policies
can be Pareto optimal in the presence of these reactions. Lastly, I have suggested that
consumer regret at not having purchased goods right before a price increase can be reduced
by curtailing in°ation and that this is a reason for central banks to pursue price stability.
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